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In this thesis, I evaluate the different interpretations of Leibniz's 
notion of compossibility.  Scholars have distinguished two ways to explicate 
Leibniz's position.  On the one hand, proponents of the “logical” 
interpretation argue that compossibility implies a logical relation between 
substances’ complete concepts.  That is, nothing more than the consideration 
of complete concepts is required.  On the other, proponents of the “lawful” 
interpretation argue that relations of lawfulness and orderliness are necessary 
in evaluating compossibility claims.  James Messina and Donald Rutherford 
argue that neither the “logical” nor “lawful” interpretation is an adequate 
account of Leibniz's position, and propose a novel interpretation of 
compossibility.  I argue, however, that this novel interpretation is flawed.  
Messina and Rutherford's reason for rejecting the “lawful” interpretation is 
as much as a reason to reject their interpretation, or so I argue.
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0. The Problem 
 The notion of compossibility in Leibniz's philosophy has two related functions.  On the 
one hand, it explains why not all possible substances are actual.  Leibniz claims that not all 
possibles are compossible such that they cannot all exist together.  On the other hand, it partitions 
all possibles into distinct possible worlds, where each possible world is constituted by a collection 
of compossible substances.   
 For Leibniz, the actual world is contingent.  God freely chose to create the actual world 
because it is the best of all possible worlds.  But God could have chosen differently.  But in order 
for Leibniz to maintain that the actual world is contingent, he must show why not all possibles 
are actual.1  For, if the actual world contained all possibles such that nothing is possible but that 
which exists, then the actual world would be absolutely necessary, which, in Leibniz's view, is 
tantamount to Spinozistic necessitarianism.   
 Leibniz admits that he was once “very close to the view of those [i.e., Spinoza] who think 
that everything is absolutely necessary,” but abandoned this view because,   
The consideration of possibles, which are not, were not, and will not be, brought 
[him] back from this precipice.  For if there are certain possibles that never exist, 
then the things that exist, at any rate, are not always necessary, for otherwise it 
would be impossible for others to exist in their place, and thus, everything that 
never exists would be impossible.2 
Leibniz claims that there are possible things that can never exist in the actual world because they 
are incompossible with the set of actual substances.  While Sherlock Holmes, or any fictional 
character, is possible in itself, since the notion of such individual does not imply a contradiction, 
Sherlock Holmes does not exist in the actual world because he is incompossible with it.  He would 
be a member of a different possible world, one that God could have chosen instead of the actual 
                                                 
1The problem of contingency in Leibniz is complex and he offers various responses to the problem.  For a 
more detailed discussion, see Adams, 9-110. 
2AG, 94 
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world.  But because God chose the actual world, substances incompossible with the set of actual 
substances, such as Sherlock Holmes, while possible, do not exist.   
 But what is the basis of compossibility?  That is, what are the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for possible substances to be compossible such that they can exist in the same possible 
world?  The question is vexed amongst Leibniz's commentators, and interpretations are largely 
divided as either “logical” or “lawful”.3  The proponents of the “logical” interpretation claim that 
the compossibility relation between substances is, as the name suggests, a logical one.  Possible 
substances can exist in the same possible world if and only if their natures or essences (complete 
concepts) are logically consistent.  Should the supposed conjunction of any two complete 
concepts result in logical inconsistency, then the corresponding substances would be 
incompossible such that God cannot co-actualize them in the same possible world.   
 The proponents of the “lawful” interpretation, by contrast, reject the claim that complete 
concepts of substances, considered by themselves, provide the basis for compossibility.  In their 
view, complete concepts alone are insufficient in determining substantial compossibility.  The 
proponents of this interpretation, rather, think that laws will partition possible substances into 
different possible worlds.  Incompossibility claims can only be evaluated by considering complete 
concepts in relation to some set of world-ordering laws. 
 In what follows, I will provide an overview of the debate concerning Leibniz's notion of 
compossibility and evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the interpretations offered on 
Leibniz's behalf.  I will not present a novel resolution, but rather argue in favor of the “lawful” 
interpretation of compossibility and defend it from recent criticism.  In Chapter 1, I will examine 
the “logical” interpretation of compossibility, and identify its central weakness.  In Chapter 2, the 
focus will be on the solutions offered by the proponents of the “lawful” interpretation.  Lastly, in 
Chapter 3, however, I will address a recent criticism against the “lawful” interpretation, and argue 
                                                 
3The expressions 'logical' and 'lawful' are introduced by Wilson. 
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that this criticism is not only problematic for the objectors but also unconvincing. 
 
1. The 'Logical' Approach 
 According to Leibniz, every (concrete or possible) individual substance has a 
corresponding complete concept, which contains all that is true of an individual substance that is 
sufficient to pick out that individual, in the divine intellect.  In a letter to Antoine Arnauld, Leibniz 
explains: 
When one considers in Adam a part of his predicates, for example, that he is the 
first man, set in a garden of pleasure, from whose side God fashioned a woman, 
and similar things conceived sub ratione generalitatis, in a general way (that is 
to say, without naming Eve, Paradise, and other circumstances that fix 
individuality), and when one calls Adam the person to whom these predicates are 
attributed, all this is not sufficient to determine the individual, for there can be an 
infinity of Adams, that is, an infinity of possible persons, different to one another, 
whom this fits … It is not possible for there to be two individuals entirely alike, 
or differing only numerically.  Therefore, we must not conceive of a vague Adam, 
that is, a person to whom certain attributes of Adam belong … rather, we must 
attribute to him a notion so complete that everything that can be attributed to 
[Adam] can be deduced from it.”4 
It appears that complete concepts must play a prominent role in discussions about the 
compossibility of individual substances.  The extent to which they determine incompossibility, 
however, is unclear and debated.  The proponents of the interpretations that will occupy the 
following pages argue that complete concepts are not only necessary but also sufficient in 
determining the compossibility of individual substances.  That is, all that is required to see 
                                                 
4AG, 72-73 
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whether or not any two possible substances are compossible or not is to see whether or not the 
supposed conjunction of their complete concepts amounts to logical inconsistency.   
 In this chapter, I will sketch out two influential 'logical' solutions to the problem of 
Leibnizian compossibility.  The first will be Benson Mates' account, and the second Nicholas 
Rescher's.  Despite the advantages offered by these two solutions, I will show that the entailment 
of 'world-bound' substances is problematic with certain aspects of Leibniz's philosophy. 
1.1 Benson Mates' Solution 
 Benson Mates takes Leibniz's claim of the reducibility of relations to entail that a 
complete concept only contains the primitive and positive properties that ground all the derivative 
properties of an individual substance, which denotes exactly one actual, or possible, individual.5  
Any two substances are compossible for Mates, then, when the conjunction of any two complete 
concepts fails to produce a contradiction.   
A pair of individual concepts, A and B, are compossible if no contradiction 
follows from the supposition that there are corresponding individuals for both of 
them – that is, if the statements 'A exists' and 'B exists' are consistent with one 
another.6 
For Mates, the compossibility relation is fully determined by the complete concepts of individual 
substances alone: nothing else but the supposition of two complete concepts in conjunction is 
needed to see whether or not the corresponding individual substances are compossible or not.  If 
the conjunction of the two complete concepts implies a contradiction, then the corresponding 
individual substances are incompossible. 
 Mates, however, notes that his way of understanding compossibility may allow the 
inference that complete concepts that belong to different possible worlds to be compossible with 
                                                 
5Mates, 63; “We may note also that sometimes Leibniz characterizes the complete concept of an 
individual, for example, Adam, as composed not of all the properties of that individual but of a core of 
“basic” (presumably simple) properties from which all of the others follow.” 
6Mates, 75-76.  See note 36 
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one another.  Mates worries that “it might be thought that in taking compossibility as a binary 
relation Leibniz was overlooking the fact that a set of concepts might be pairwise satisfiable 
without being satisfiable as a whole.”7  If so, Mates contends, “one might suppose that, just as we 
can easily find three distinct statements P, Q, and R such that although P is consistent with Q and 
with R, yet Q and R are inconsistent with one another, so also we could expect to find three 
different individual concepts such that the first was compossible with the second and with the 
third, but the second was not compossible with the third.”8  Mates, however, thinks that the above 
inference does not extend to Leibnizian complete concepts because of the universal expression 
thesis, which states that “each individual substance expresses the whole universe in its own way, 
and that all its events, together with all the circumstances and the whole sequence of external 
things, are included in its notion.”9 
 For Mates, the claim that substances mirror or express their respective worlds imply that 
complete concepts that belong to different possible worlds are incompossible.  The reasoning is 
that, if an individual substance expresses its entire universe, then it implies that that substance 
stands in relations to its world-mates.  Since for Mates complete concepts contain only the 
primitive and positive properties of substances, which are sufficient to individuate substances, the 
relational properties of substances will be derivative of these properties.  Consider, for example, 
the complete concept of the actual Adam, which contains the primitive and positive properties 
that are sufficient to individuate this particular individual.  According to Mates, the universal 
expression thesis implies that Adam stands in relations with all his world-mates, including his 
wife, Eve.  Adam's relation to Eve, and, conversely, Eve's relation to Adam, are grounded in the 
properties contained in their respective complete concepts.  Were Adam to have a different spousal 
relation to, say, a counterpart of Eve, Eve*, then he would no longer be Adam but a different 
individual that falls under a different complete concept.  Therefore, since Adam would not be the 
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same individual had he not been the husband of Eve, and Eve would not be the same individual 
had she not been the wife of Adam, Mates concludes that Adam and Eve could not have existed 
without each other.    
 On Mates' account, every individual substance is 'world-bound' to a single maximally 
consistent possible world. 10   This result follows from Mates' reading of Leibniz's universal 
expression thesis: that every individual substances expresses its world implies that the 
corresponding complete concepts of individual substances will involve information about world-
mates.  In other words, if a substance's individuating properties involve information about its 
world-mates, then it seems that that individual substance would need its world-mates to exist as 
that individual substance.  For example, since Adam's complete concept contains the properties 
that can only ground relations to the substances that Adam expresses, the supposition of Adam's 
existence entails the existence of Eve along with all of the substances that he expresses, and the 
non-existence of any substance with whom he lacks an expression relation. Adam cannot exist 
apart from his world-mates, and, whatever set of substances that God creates, it'll be a set that is 
maximally compossible. 
 Mates' way of understanding compossibility clearly explains why not all possible 
substances are actual.  Since the compossibility relation partitions the totality of possible 
substances into mutually exclusive and exhaustive equivalence classes, God will have genuine 
options in his choice of worlds, none of which will contain all possible substances.  However, 
there are some worries.  Mates himself notes how it is unclear how any two complete concepts in 
conjunction can imply logical inconsistency if complete concepts contain only the primitive 
(simple) and positive properties of substances.  Leibniz himself seemed to have been confounded 
by this.      
                                                 
10Mates understands a possible world to be a maximally consistent set of compossible substances.  He 
writes, “We are also told by Leibniz that the actual world is maximal, in the sense that it contains 
everything compossible with what it contains, and there is no reason to doubt that this holds for other 
possible worlds as well” (Mates, 77). 
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It is as yet unknown to men, whence arises the incompossibility of diverse things, 
or how it can happen that diverse essences are opposed to each other, seeing that 
all purely positive terms seems to be compatible inter se.11 
Understanding complete concepts to include only primitive and positive properties makes it 
difficult to say that incompossibility results from logical inconsistency between complete 
concepts.  For one, a positive property is one that does not involve an negation of any other 
property.  Suppose for simplicity's sake, that there are two complete concepts, A and B, each 
containing a single positive, p and q, respectively.  On Mates' proposal, the reason that the 
corresponding substances of A and B are incompossible is because the supposition of the 
conjunction of A and B involves a contradiction.  In other words, A and B are incompossible 
because the properties of A and B, p and q respectively, contradict one another.  However, if the 
properties, p and q, as positive properties, involve no negation of any other property (specifically 
one another), then it seems difficult to see how any contradiction can result on the supposition of 
the conjunction, p & q. 
 The inclusion of relational properties in complete concepts would be one way to get 
logically inconsistency between complete concepts.  However, Mates thinks the properties in 
complete concepts have to be primitive, as relational properties would violate Leibniz's 
reducibility of relations thesis.12  This may, however, be more a problem for Leibniz than it is for 
Mates, since Leibniz does tell us that there are “no purely extrinsic denominations, denominations 
which have absolutely no foundation in the very thing denominated.”13  Some commentators, 
notably Nicholas Rescher, find Leibniz's claim of the reducibility of relations, without 
qualification, to be deeply problematic for his metaphysics.  Rescher notes that Leibniz “cannot 
afford to abolish the reality of relations because without them he could not get one of the key 
                                                 
11G VIII 194; Translation Russell's; 364; appendix 121 
12Mates, 76; Mates notes the problem of explaining compossibility while taking seriously Leibniz's 
reducibility of relations.  He writes, “Commentators have wondered how the existence of one 
individual could preclude that of another, especially since Leibniz denies the reality of relations.” 
13AG, 32 
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building blocks of his metaphysical system”, namely, substantial incompossibility.14  Thus, while 
Mate's reading of the notion of compossibility offers a simple way to understand how possible 
substances are incompossible, one difficulty is that it doesn't seem clear how any logical 
inconsistency between complete concepts can be generated by properties that are included in them.   
1.2 Nicholas Rescher's Solution  
 Like Mates, Nicholas Rescher also takes complete concepts alone to be sufficient to 
determine substantial compossibility.  Rescher, however, thinks that Leibniz needs relations in 
order to explain the incompossibility of substances, and includes them into complete concepts.  
The inclusion of relational properties in complete concepts, Rescher argues, is consistent with the 
reducibility of relations thesis if we understand it as a metaphysical, and not a logical, thesis in 
Leibniz's philosophy.  He writes, “Leibniz is concerned to establish not the logical eliminability 
of relations but their metaphysical dispensability at the level of individual substances.”15  Rescher 
understands the motivation for Leibniz's reducibility of relations is to deny the metaphysical 
reality of relations as real existences at the level of substances, that is, relational properties that 
have “one leg in one [substance] and the other in the other”, so to speak.16  Leibniz never intended, 
Rescher argues, the “logical reduction of a relation into something nonrelational.”17  According 
to Rescher, “relations – while from a certain point of view indeed 'ideal' – nevertheless have a 
solid foothold in undoubted reality in the modifications of substances.”18  However, they are not 
real things in themselves, “but a dependent reality correlative with the inherence in the related 
terms.” 19   That is, relations “exist in and through the characteristics of real things, being 
embeddable in the makeup of substances.”20  On this reading, relations will not be, then, purely 
extrinsic denominations, existences that are independent of substances and their properties, but 
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entities that always derive their reality from the modifications of singulars.21 
 Rescher thinks that the reducibility of relations thesis, properly understood, does not 
pertain to the relations between substances.  It describes, rather, a grounding relationship between 
facts about substances.  Relational facts, such as “Adam is the father of Cain”, will be grounded 
in, and, therefore, extractable from the features of Adam's and Cain's non-relational descriptive 
content contained in the respective complete concepts.  Adam's complete concept will contain 
two facts, namely, (1) being a father, and (2) being a father in virtue of Cain's being a son.  In 
Cain's complete concept, there will be the facts (1) being a son, and (2) being a son in virtue of 
Adam's being a father.22  Thus, the relational fact, “Adam is the father of Cain”, can be extracted 
by considering the predicational facts about the relata.  Incompossible substances are ones whose 
complete concepts contain logically contradictory relational properties.  For example, if the 
complete concept of Adam contains the property of being the father of Cain, and a counterpart of 
Cain, Cain*, contains the property of being the son of Noah, then to suppose that both are 
actualized together will imply logical inconsistency. 
 Rescher agrees with Mates on the significance of the universal expression thesis.  For 
Rescher, that individual substances express their respective worlds implies that substances' 
relations are embedded in the complete concepts. 
The idea that each substance mirrors the whole universe from its own point of 
view is meant to suggest that it itself bears within its own qualitative makeup the 
imprint of the nature of its fellows.”23 
Rescher thinks that relations “are and have to be impressed with the inner design of the 
propositional structure of their defining descriptions.” 24   By this, Rescher understands 
substantival relations as concept-internalized in such a way that “relations are included within the 
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concept of a thing and nowise independent of it: the defining notions of substances embody 
grappling hooks into the environing world.”25  Since neither Adam's complete concept nor Cain*'s 
express one another, the relational fact, “Adam is the father of Cain*”, cannot be extracted from 
their complete concepts.   
 Since every individual substances's “qualitative makeup” includes their relations, every 
individual substance is world-bound, that is, a member of exactly one maximally consistent 
possible world.26 
We also arrive at a “one-substance, one-world” doctrine: every substance has 
imprinted in its defining nature (its complete individual concept) an internalized 
representation of its entire environing world.  No substance can – even in 
hypothesis be pried loose from its world environment and transposed into some 
other possible world.  No possible substance can populate two distinct possible 
worlds, and no member of one can be compatibly united with any other member 
of any other.27 
Since there is a conceptual linkage between compossible complete concepts, compossible 
substances cannot exist separated from each other.  Possible substances' ability to “constitute a 
possible world – their synoptic compossiblity – is a global and comprehensively systematic 
feature of a group of possible individuals”, therefore, “each substance within a possible world 
carries within itself an ineradicable imprint of all the rest.”28 
In consequence of these conceptual interconnections of substance with all the 
others of its world, a substance stands to these others in a rigidly unalterable 
                                                 
25Rescher, 79 
26Rescher, 7; “Possible worlds are therefore existentially saturated: once a possible world is constituted in 
conception, there is never any possibility of adding further possible substances to its content.  The 
description of the world precludes any prospect of additions: there cannot be any possible substance 
that is not already a member of a given possible world and yet is compossible with the substances of 
the world in question … Possible worlds are by nature – that is, as worlds – necessarily maximal 
manifolds of existences.” 
27Rescher, 6 
28Rescher, 81 
  Kim 11 
association.  To change the description of a substance (however slightly) in any 
way – even in thought – is to alter all the others as well; it is to “change the subject” 
as it were, by bringing into consideration an entirely different framework of 
things, another possible world altogether.29 
Since on Rescher's account, individual substances will be individuated by the totality of their 
relations, a substance's concrete relations to its world-mates are hypothetically necessary features 
of that substance.30  In other words, insofar as God chooses to actualize Adam, for Adam to be 
the very substance denoted by his complete concept, he will necessarily have the concrete 
relations to its world-mates. 
1.3 World-Bound Substances 
 One common feature of both Mates' and Rescher's respective accounts is the entailment 
of world-bound substances: Every individual substance is a member of only one maximally 
consistent possible world.  As Mates explains, “Since Adam exists, there is no nonactual possible 
world W such that Adam would have existed if God had created W.”31  In other words, Adam is 
bound to an absolute world-environment such that he only exists in a world in which Eve, Cain, 
and the rest of his world-mates exist.  Adam could not be actualized in a different world-
environment where, for example, Eve is not present.  This is because Mates and Rescher both 
agree on the significance of Leibniz's universal expression thesis: Adam's expressing his entire 
universe implies that Adam's complete concept involves information about his world-mates.   
 On Mates' and Rescher's respective readings, every individual substance is world bound 
because no individual substance can exist without it world-mates.  Since God's knowledge of 
Adam necessarily involves Adam's world-mates, they suggest that it is logically impossible for 
Adam to exist apart from its world-mates and that the existence of Adam will entail the existence 
                                                 
29Rescher, 6; (emphasis added.) 
30Rescher, 83; “Since its relations are always built into the complete individual notion that is identifiably 
definitive of a particular substance, there is no way of tampering with the relations of a substance: Its 
concrete relations are always hypothetically necessary features of it as the very substance it is.” 
31Mates, 78 
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of hiss world-mates.  However, not only are there no texts (as far as I am aware) that explicitly 
commit Leibniz to this position, but there is evidence that, rather than logical necessity, it is God's 
considerations of harmony that results in God's creating a substance's world-mates in creating that 
very substance.32 
 In addition, there is evidence that substances do not depend on one another in the way 
Mates and Rescher suggest.  For example, Leibniz tells us that, “each substance is like a world 
apart, independent of all other things, except for God.”33  And, in a letter to Des Bosses, “[A] 
monad, like a soul, is, as it were, a certain world of its own, having no connections of dependency 
except with God.”34  Passages such as these seem to support the notion that Leibnizian substances 
are ontologically independent existences that do not per se depend on one another such as to 
exclude or entail one another.  If Leibnizian substances are indeed independent in this sense, then 
it seems that it should be possible for any individual substance to exist separated from its world-
mates.  However, Mates and Rescher both take the formal natures of substances to involve their 
relations to other created substances either indirectly (Mates) or directly (Rescher) such that it is 
logically impossible for an individual substance to exist apart from its world-mates.  Aware of 
this inconsistency, Mates thinks that Leibniz abandoned the traditional notion of ontological 
independence as he developed his universal expression thesis.35 
 A further problem with world bound substances is that, as Robert Adams notes, Leibniz's 
statements regarding pre-established harmony suggest against it.  Leibniz denies causal influence 
between created substances, holding that substances themselves are the genuine causes of all their 
states.  In explaining the appearance of causal dependence in the physical world, Leibniz invokes 
his doctrine of pre-established harmony: 
God from the beginning constituted both the soul and the body with such wisdom 
                                                 
32See Adams, 102 – 106. 
33AG, 47 
34AG, 199 
35Mates, 192, 221 
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and such workmanship that, from the first constitution or notion of a thing, 
everything that happens through itself [per se] in the one corresponds perfectly 
to everything that happens in the other, just as if something passed from one to 
the other.36   
Adams notes that “in explaining the pre-established harmony Leibniz repeatedly says that only 
the action of God can cause created substances to correspond to each other's perceptions.”37  
Leibniz even takes this difficulty of accommodation to be a proof of a being with infinite 
knowledge and power, namely, God.     
For since each of these Souls expresses in its way what goes on outside, and 
cannot have this through any influence of other particular Beings, or rather must 
draw this expression from the resources of its own nature (or this internal reason 
of the expression of what is outside) from a universal cause on which all these 
Beings depend and which makes the one perfectly agree and correspond with the 
other.  This is not possible without an infinite knowledge and power, and by so 
great an artifice, especially with respect to the spontaneous agreement of the 
machine with the actions of the reasonable soul, that [Bayle] doubted, as it were, 
whether it did not surpass all possible wisdom, saying that the wisdom of God 
did not seem to him too great for such an effect, and recognized at least that the 
feeble conceptions that we can have of the divine perfection had never been put 
in such high relief.38 
However, Adams points out that such a proof would not be a very convincing proof at all were it 
the case that it is impossible for God's creating a world where accommodation fails to obtain.  He 
writes, 
But the harmony or correspondence of the perceptions of created substances with 
                                                 
36AG, 33 
37Ibid. 
38NE 440f.; Adams, 106 
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each other could hardly be such a powerful proof of God's infinite wisdom and 
power if no creator could have created a world that lacked such a correspondence 
as Des Bosses pointed out to Leibniz in 1715.  The use of the pre-established 
harmony to prove the greatness of the creator seems therefore to presuppose that 
among the possible worlds that God could have actualized were some in which 
created substances fail to correspond with each other's perceptions.  Accordingly, 
Leibniz responded flatly to Des Bosses that God 'was able absolutely [to create 
one of those monads that now exist without creating all the others], but was not 
able hypothetically, given that he decided to do everything most wisely and 
harmoniously'.39 
Because Mates and Rescher claim that complete concepts contain information regarding world-
mates, they cannot admit a possible world in which there is no correspondence (expression 
relation), since they take no correspondence between any two substances to imply their 
incompossibility.  But Leibniz's proof of an omniscient and omnipotent being based upon the 
difficulty of achieving this correspondence would not be cogent if we view it in light of Mates' 
and Rescher's respective accounts.  Leibniz's proof requires the presupposition that there are 
possible worlds in which individual substances fail to correspond to each other amongst the 
choices that God could have created, something that neither Mates nor Rescher can grant on their 
respective readings. 
 The 'logical' solutions of Mates and Rescher offer a simple and clear notion of 
compossibility, one that can perform all the functions that Leibniz clearly needs it to perform in 
his metaphysics.  If the supposition of any two complete concepts imply logical inconsistency, 
then the corresponding individual substances cannot exist together in the same world.  However, 
a reason against adopting their views is the entailment of world-bound substances, which seems 
                                                 
39Ibid. 
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not only to conflict with Leibniz's commitment to the doctrine of ontological independence but 
also his account of pre-established harmony as well. 
 
2. The 'Lawful' Approach 
 The proponents of the “lawful” interpretation hold that compossibility is determined by 
lawful constraints.  The motivation for arguing for a 'lawful' interpretation, Margaret Wilson 
explains, is that there is “good textual reason to suppose that Leibnizian incompossibility has 
something to do with laws.”40  For example, in his correspondence with Arnauld, Leibniz writes:   
There were an infinity of possible ways of creating the world, according to the 
different designs which God might form, and each possible world depends upon 
certain principal designs or ends of God proper to itself, i.e., certain primitive free 
decrees (conceived sub ratione possibilitatis), or laws of the general order of this 
possible universe, to which they belong, and whose notion they determine, as well 
as the notions of all individual substances which belong to this same Universe.41  
Passages like this one seem to suggest the important role of laws in determining substantial 
compossibility.  This raises important questions.  First, in what way does the notion of 'law' 
determine compossibility?  Second, which law(s) determines compossibility? 
 The “lawful” interpretation has a distinct advantage over the “logical” interpretation, 
namely, it can accommodate Leibniz's claims in the “world apart” passages.  The proponents of 
the “lawful” interpretation deny that complete concepts, considered by themselves, are the basis 
of compossibility.  In their view, independent of any lawful constraints, the existence of an 
individual substance will neither exclude nor entail the existence of any finite substance.   
 The plan of this chapter will be as follows.  In [2.1], I will begin with Bertrand Russell's 
interpretation, which claims that any two substances are incompossible in the case that there is no 
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general law to which both conform.  Margaret Wilson argues that Russell's emphasis on “general” 
laws (or lawfulness simpliciter) fails to offer a non-vacuous notion of compossibility.  However, 
I will argue that Wilson misreads Russell, and that Russell actually offers a view of the notion of 
'law' that is equivalent to the notion that Wilson adopts for her reading, which we will examine in 
[2.2].  In [2.3], we will consider J. A. Cover and John O'Leary-Hawthorne's “lawful” reading, 
which takes lawful harmony as determining compossibility, and, in [2.4], I will present evidence 
in favor of the view that the basis of compossibility for Leibniz is lawful harmony.  Then I will 
consider a recent interpretation of compossibility that challenges both the “lawful” and “logical” 
interpretations on the notion of 'connectedness'.   
2.1 Bertrand Russell and General Laws 
 One clear departure that Bertrand Russell takes from the 'logical' interpretations is that he 
takes all possible substances to be per se compossible: the formal natures of individual substances 
do not per se exclude or entail one another's existence.  The motivation for the per se 
compossibility of all possible substances stems from Russell's understanding that there are no 
necessary connections between contingent predicates.  Each contingent predicate, Russell thinks, 
is necessarily connected with the complete concept of a substance, but no two contingent 
predicates are necessarily connected with each other.  The possibility that “each separate 
contingent predicate might also have belonged to a different substance”, Russell argues, would 
seem to entail that “any collection of possible existents must be compossible, since their 
coexistence cannot be self-contradictory.”42 
 But, given the per se composssibility of all possible substances, how are substances 
incompossible?  After citing the passage from the Arnauld correspondence above, Russell 
concludes, 
This passage proves quite definitely that all possible worlds have general laws, 
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which determine the connection of contingents just as, in the actual world, it is 
determined by the laws of motion and the law that free spirits pursue what seems 
best to them.  And without the need for some general laws, any two possibles 
would be compossible, since they cannot contradict one another.  Possibles cease 
to be compossible only when there is no general law whatever to which both 
conform.  What is called the “reign of law” is, in Leibniz’s philosophy, 
metaphysically necessary, although the actual laws are contingent. If this is not 
realized, compossibility must remain unintelligible.43 
Russell emphasizes the importance of the Principle of Sufficient Reason in the compossibility of 
substances.  He writes, “Although this or that sufficient reason is contingent, there must be some 
sufficient reason, and the lack of one condemns many series of existents as metaphysically 
impossible.”44  Russell's solution turns on the metaphysical necessity of a sufficient reason for a 
possible world's existence, which is cashed out as the obtaining of general laws.  For Russel, per 
se compossible substances cannot co-exist in the same possible world if and only if they fail to 
conform to general law(s).45 
 However, Margaret Wilson argues that Russell's emphasis on general laws suffers from a 
fatal flaw.  The condition under which per se compossible substance can fail to be compossible, 
namely, failing to instantiate any general law, is metaphysically impossible to satisfy in Leibniz.  
She refers to §6 of the Discourse on Metaphysics (DM), where Leibniz claims that absolute 
irregularity or unlawfulness is metaphysically impossible. 
  Thus, what passes for extraordinary is extraordinary only with some particular 
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45 Margaret Wilson argues that Russell's solution is able to accommodate the textual evidence that emphas
izes the importance of laws in partitioning possible worlds “without (ultimately) giving up the "analytic" 
understanding of (in)compossibility” (Wilson, 129).  She argues that Russell's emphasis on lawfulness un
der general laws, as being metaphysically necessary, indicates that incompossible substances, substances t
hat lack a metaphysically necessary sufficient reason for existing together, are those whose co-existence is 
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order established among creatures; for everything is in conformity with respect to the universal 
order.  This is true to such an extent that not only does nothing completely irregular occur in the 
world, but we would not even be able to imagine such a thing.  Thus, let us assume, for example, 
that someone jots down a number of points at random on a piece of paper, as do those who practice 
the ridiculous art of geomancy.  I maintain it is possible to find a geometric line whose notion is 
constant and uniform, following a certain rule, such that this line passes through all the points in 
the same order In which the hand jotted them down … Thus, one can say, in whatever manner 
God might have created the world, it would always have been regular and accordance with a 
certain general order.46 
In light of this passage, Wilson infers that, for Leibniz, “any putative group of possibilities must 
conform to some law or other; [therefore] the Russellian formulation turns out to be vacuous on 
Leibnizian principles.”47  In other words, to say that substances are incompossible if and only if 
they fail to conform to general laws requires, as an assumption, the possibility irregularity or 
unlawfulness.  However, as Wilson points out, it is metaphysically impossible to satisfy such a 
condition, thereby substantial incompossibility would never obtain. 
 I, however, think that Wilson misreads Russell.  Although her interpretation is correct if 
Russell did indeed took general lawfulness as the basis of compossibility, I don't think that this is 
the case.  One reason is that Russell writes that, “All possible worlds have general laws, analogous 
to the [actual] laws of motion; what these laws are, is contingent, but that there are such laws is 
necessary.”48  I think this passage indicates that, contrary to Wilson, Russell is not talking about 
lawfulness simpliciter.  Russell's choice of adjective to describe the laws relevant for 
compossibility is unfortunate, but in this passage Russell seems to take the “general” laws that 
partition possible worlds to denote something close to or equivalent to “laws of motion” or laws 
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of nature.49  In addition, in the passage that Wilson cites, Russell states in the first sentence: “This 
passage [from the correspondence with Arnauld above] proves quite definitely that all possible 
worlds have general laws, which determine the connection of contingents just as, in the actual 
world, it is determined by the laws of motion.”  In the actual world, the connection of contingents 
is determined by the laws of motion that are true in the actual world.  Russell's point is that, 
similarly, all possible worlds will necessarily have contingent laws of nature that connect possible 
substances just as the laws of nature connect substances in the actual world. 
 Therefore, I don't think that Russell is saying that general laws (in the broadest sense 
denoting mere lawfulness) is what partitions possible substances into different possible worlds:  
“Hence two or more things which cannot be brought under one and the same set of general laws 
[qua laws of nature] are not compossible.”50  His point is that, although laws of motion (or laws 
of nature) themselves are contingent, every collection of possible substances that constitute a 
possible world necessarily has contingent laws of motion (or laws of nature).  So contrary to 
Wilson, when Russell claims that a “necessity for some sufficient reason of the whole series,” 
such that “the lack of one condemns many series of existents as metaphysically impossible,” he 
is not saying that collections of substances that fail to obtain any lawful relation whatsoever lacks 
a sufficient reason for their existence.  Rather, that any series that does not conform to some 
contingent law of motion (or laws of nature in the standard sense) such as to constitute a possible 
world is metaphysically impossible. 
 Then, it seems that Russell is claiming that substances are compossible if and only if they 
can conform to “general” laws (e.g., contingent laws of motion or nature).  Whatever collection 
of substances that do not conform to such laws will be incompossible, that is, lack a sufficient 
reason to exist in the same possible world.  For Leibniz, the actual world is governed by morally 
necessary laws of nature.  So insofar as God chooses such (actual) laws, only possible substances 
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that conform to those laws will be actualized.  There are, nevertheless, unactualized but possible 
laws of nature (e.g., the Cartesian laws of motion) and the possible substances that conform to 
those laws. 
2.2 Laws as “Facts” 
 If Russell indeed took “general” laws to denote something like laws of motion, then 
Russell seems to view the notion of “law” in the same way that Wilson understands it.  Her reading 
of “law” is based on the following passages from the Arnauld correspondence. 
For, since there is an infinity of possible worlds, there is also an infinity of 
possible laws, some proper to one world, others proper to another, and each 
possible individual of a world includes the laws of its world in its notion.51 
And, so, 
For example, if this world were only possible, the individual notion of some body 
in this world, which includes the certain motions as possible, would also include 
our laws of motion (which are free decrees of God, but also only as possible).52 
Wilson thinks that the “laws” mentioned in these passages refers to “something at least close to 
laws of nature in the standard sense.”53  She speculates, “the requirement that individuals, to be 
compossible, must conform to possible basic designs and primitive free decrees of God expresses 
a metaphysical condition that is not trivially satisfied by just any group of possible substances.”  
In other words, God could only have a sufficient reason to create a world in which possible 
substances are linked by “fairly simple lawful generalities.” 
 However, Wilson's view diverges with Russell's in one key way.  Wilson points out that 
Leibniz, in the same letter to Arnauld, claims that “each individual substance concept contains in 
itself a set of world laws in a quite determinate way,” which, she thinks, suggests that the laws of 
nature that govern substances' worlds are included in the complete individual concepts as certain 
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kinds of “facts”.54  That is to say, complete concepts imply possible “facts” about the worlds in 
which they belong, and the substances that imply logically inconsistent “facts” will be 
incompossible.  For example, if one concept of a certain individual, S, contains the “fact”, e = 
mc2, while the concept of another, T, contains the “fact”, e = 2mc, then to suppose that both are 
created in the same possible world amounts to logical contradiction, e = mc2 ^ e = 2mc.55 
 Recall that Russell thinks that all possible substances are per se compossible because of 
the lack of necessary connections between the contingent properties of substances.  The 
conjunction of any two possible substances (or their complete concepts) will not entail any logical 
inconsistency such as to preclude their co-actualization.  For Wilson, however, any two 
incompossible substances will entail logical inconsistency in virtue of their complete concepts 
alone, since she argues that the laws of nature are included in the complete concepts as “facts”.   
 However, by understanding the laws as included in complete concepts as “facts”, one 
potential weakness of Wilson's reading is that it can entail that substances are world-bound.  The 
potential problem hinges on the question of whether or not the laws of nature included in 
substances' complete concepts are essential to substances.  If they are, then, on Wilson's reading, 
substances will be world-bound such that no individual substance can exist in a world with laws 
of nature other than the ones contained in its complete concept.56  But the entailment of world-
bound substances, as I have pointed out in the previous chapter, is in tension with Leibniz's claims 
in the “world apart” passages.  Thus, if the laws of nature included in complete concepts are 
essential, then it would seem that, on Wilson's reading, every substance will be world-bound.  
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Russell, on the other hand, does not have this worry.  On his “lawful” view, “the plurality of 
substances is not necessary; it would have been possible for God to create only one monad, and 
this one might have been any one of the actual created monads.”57 
2.3 Hypothetical Compossibility    
 J. A. Cover and John O'Leary-Hawthorne agree with Wilson's interpretation that the 
“relevant facts about laws that generate incompossibility results are much richer than the general 
requirement of lawfulness.”
58  They reject, however, Wilson's claim that the facts about laws to 
be contained in complete concepts because it conflicts with their reading of Leibnizian 
essentialism. 
 According to Cover and O'Leary-Hawthorne's strong essentialism, “each possible 
individual substance is constituted by a primitive form or law-of-the-series that determines a 
sequence of intrinsic denominations.”59  All that is essential to individual substances are their 
respective intrinsic denominations.  Substances' relations, on the other hand, are not essential 
since Cover and O'Leary-Hawthorne take relational facts that obtain at a world to “supervene on 
the basic monadic properties included in the complete concepts instantiated at that world.”
60  An 
individual substance's relations are determined only when its intrinsic denominations are paired 
with certain laws of expression that describe the “sequence of harmonious changes in substances 
at that world.”61  Therefore, on strong essentialism, an individual substance will have different 
relations depending on which laws of expression are paired with its intrinsic denominations.  In 
effect, since the laws of expression that determine an individual substance's relations are not 
absolutely necessary, no individual substance is, according to Cover and O'Leary-Hawthorne, 
bound to any absolute world-environment.   
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 Given this interpretation of Leibniz's essentialism, it seems imperative that the strong 
essentialist provide an account of how possible substances are incompossible.  Since substances' 
relational facts co-vary with the laws of expression that are conjoined to their intrinsic 
denominations, as a result, all possible substances will be per se compossible.  The strong 
essentialist claims that “for perceptual states of monads to mirror one another and harmonize as 
they do in the best of all possible worlds, it is sufficient simply that there be a relational law or 
set of laws made true by God's instantiating a certain set of intrinsic monadic histories.”62  In 
effect, God's instantiating any set of substances will necessarily produce a world in which 
substances mirror each other.  (The degree of harmony that substances' will mirror or express one 
another will depend on which laws of harmony God chooses.)  However, if we suppose, like Mates 
and Rescher, that a possible world is a maximally consistent set of compossible substances, and 
all possible substances are per se compossible, then it seems to follow that there is only one 
maximally consistent possible world, namely, the set of all possible substances.  If there is a 
maximality constraint on possible worlds, and all possible substances are per se compossible, then 
it would seem that there would only be one maximally consistent possible world that God could 
choose. 
 Cover and O'Leary-Hawthorne deny the above inference from strong essentialism to 
Spinozistic necessitarianism by rejecting the premise of maximality (as understood by Mates and 
Rescher).  In other words, they deny that a possible world, by definition, is a maximally consistent 
set of compossible substances, a definition they see as conflicting with Leibniz's modal claims 
about substances: “If each substance can, as Leibniz insists, exist as a world apart, independently 
of any others actual or possible, then each possible world is hardly maximal.”63 
 They acknowledge, however, that “Leibniz believed that the actual world enjoys a sort of 
maximality.”64  But for Cover and O'Leary-Hawthorne, the actual world is maximal in the sense 
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that it contains the “collection of finite substances that are maximally compossible with the laws 
of greatest harmony.”  The maximality that the actual world enjoys “stems from the maximal 
goodness of God's creative intentions – which, roughly, combines plenitude with lawful 
harmony.”65  They do not see any reason to infer that the maximality that the actual world enjoys 
implies that all possible worlds are likewise maximal.  On their view, “maximality is at best 
morally necessary rather than a feature of every possible world.”  Given this understanding, it is 
possible for substances to exist as a “world apart” because “such a world is morally inferior and 
so, as he says in the Rorarius remarks, 'contrary to the designs of God' but nevertheless 
'metaphysically possible,' since the designs of God determine moral necessity but not 
metaphysical necessity.” 
 To the question of how per se compossible substances can be incompossible, Cover and 
O'Leary-Hawthorne appeal to hypothetically necessary laws of harmony. 
In most contexts, Leibniz is interested in what substances are compossible with 
God's designs for the best.  He is thus for the most part interested in questions of 
what things are hypothetically compossible, where the hypothesis involves 
certain – albeit morally necessary – decrees of harmony.  Of course not every 
world enjoys the laws of harmony that actually prevail.  There are other possible, 
morally inferior, sets of decrees.  And for each set of decrees God can make, He 
knows which sets of substances are compossible with each other together with 
those laws. 66 
According to Cover and O'Leary-Hawthorne, claims about incompossibility are ones about 
hypothetical incompossibility rather than incompossibility per se. 67   In other words, per se 
compossible substances will be incompossible on the hypothesis of certain sets of lawful decrees, 
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where the relevant laws will be laws of expression that determine harmonious relations.68  Possible 
substances are partitioned into possible worlds due to the fact that, “for each set of decrees God 
can make, [God] knows which sets of substances are compossible with each other together with 
those laws.”  Since Cover and O'Leary-Hawthorne take the laws of harmony that obtain in any 
given possible world to supervene on the substances that are members, the actual world would be 
the set of substances on which the best laws of harmony supervene.  And on the supposition that 
God decrees the best (hypothetically necessary) laws of harmony, only those substances that will 
instantiate the laws will be created, and no possible substance that does not.69 
2.4 Harmony, Compossibility, and Connection 
 I think that Cover and O'Leary-Hawthorne's reading of compossibility is attractive.  There 
is no denying the great importance that the notion of harmony plays in Leibniz's thinking.  Indeed, 
Leibniz identifies the greatest harmony as the cause of God's actions. 
For what exists is the best, or harmonious. This is established by an invincible 
demonstration, because the first and unique efficient cause of things is mind; the 
cause of mind, that is, the cause of its action, or the end of things, is harmony; 
and in the case of the most perfect mind, the cause is the greatest harmony.70   
And, in the Theodicy, Leibniz claims that “it is of the essence of God's wisdom that all should be 
harmonious in his works.”71  As a result, the works of God are “the most harmonious it is possible 
to conceive.”72  He also tells us that “happiness is the state of mind most pleasing to the mind 
itself, but nothing is pleasing to a mind except harmony.”73  And, “since God is the most perfect 
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mind, it is impossible that he is not affected by the most perfect harmony.”74 
 These passages suggest, I think, that Leibniz ultimately took the basis of compossibility 
to be harmony.  After all, in some places, Leibniz suggests that harmony places restrictions on 
God's will.  For example, “we mustn't doubt that the happiness of minds is the principal aim of 
God and that he puts this into practice to the extent that general harmony permits it.”75  The idea 
here seems to be that, while it is metaphysically possible for God to create the world with more 
happiness, God did not create the world in that way because of certain restrictions of harmony.  
In addition, Leibniz even claims that the violation of harmony is the sufficient reason for why 
some things cannot exist together.   
[A] possible thing is something with some essence or reality, that is, something 
that can distinctly be understood.  For example, a pentagon would remain possible 
even if we were to imagine that no exact pentagon ever was or would be in nature.  
However, one should give some reason for why no pentagon ever existed or 
would exist.  The reason for this state of affairs is nothing but the fact that the 
pentagon is incompatible with other things that include more perfection, that is, 
with other things that include more reality, which, to be sure, exist ahead of the 
pentagon.76 
Leibniz tells us that an exact pentagon in nature is “incompatible with other things that include 
more perfection” such that it cannot exist in the actual world.  He then explains that this 
'incompatibility' between an exact pentagon and existing things results because of the 'harmony 
of things'. 
For the pentagon is not absolutely impossible, nor does it imply a contradiction, 
even if it follows from the harmony of things that a pentagon can find no place 
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among real things.77 
Later in the same text, he seems to suggest that it is hypothetically necessary that some possibles, 
such as an exact pentagon, do not exist in the actual world, in which a certain harmony has been 
established by God. 
For God, who foresees the future reasons why some things should exist rather 
than others, foresees them in their causes with certain knowledge.  And indeed, 
he has certain knowledge of them and formulates propositions that are necessary, 
given that the state of the world has, once and for all, been settled, that is, given 
the harmony of things.78 
Given that the harmony of the actual world has been established, Leibniz tells us, certain 
propositions are necessary on the hypothesis of harmony.  In effect, certain propositions, such as 
“No exact pentagon exists in the actual world” is necessary on the hypothesis that God constructed 
the world with a certain kind of harmony.  Supposing then, that the actual world is maximally 
harmonious, which obtains, as Cover and O'Leary-Hawthorne suggest, via the best laws of 
harmony, then it seems that it is hypothetically necessary that whatever doesn't conform to such 
laws will “find no place among real things.” 
 However, on such explanations of why certain possibles cannot exist together, as Robert 
Adams points out, “it is not incompossibility but harmony that is called in to solve the 
fundamental problem.79  However, one may think that the notion of compossibility must put 
constraints on which possible substances God can actualize independent of the notion of harmony.  
As Wilson puts it, “constraints of lawfulness and order of some kind are needed to define the “pre-
established harmony."  Invoking them to account for compossibility as well risks collapsing what 
seem to be intended as distinct concepts into each other.”80 
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 But I don't think that the notion of incompossibility must be understood as independent 
of his notion of harmony.  I think there are good reasons, least of all the texts that indicate that 
harmony is the reason why some things cannot exist in the actual world, to think that harmony 
ultimately determines whether or not possibles can exist together in the same world.  Indeed, 
Adams speculates that perhaps “the appeal to incompossibility is just a covert appeal to 
considerations of harmony.”81  However, he continues, 
[Incompossibility] would be something more if Leibniz thought that the internal 
states of possible substances are perceptions that are conceptually connected with 
the existence and states of other substances, so that no individual in any possible 
world has exactly the same history of internal states as any individual in any other 
possible world.”82 
Mates and Rescher both take incompossibility to be something more than God's considerations of 
laws or harmony precisely because they understand the universal expression thesis to imply 
conceptual connections between compossible complete concepts.  In effect, they interpret 
substantial incompossibility as logical incompatibility between complete concepts, independent 
of God's considerations of harmony.  However, the problem is that Leibniz's statements in the 
'world-apart' passages seem to be in tension with such connections between substances: “[A] 
monad, like a soul, is, as it were, a certain world of its own, having no connection of dependency 
except with God.”83  It is precisely the lack of these connections between the formal natures of 
substances that individual substances can be considered as ontologically independent existences.  
Therefore, a harmony independent notion of compossibility will be necessary only if Leibniz 
thought that there were conceptual connections between substances.  Since the “world apart” 
passages strongly suggest that substances lack such connections, it doesn't seem that a harmony 
independent notion of compossibility is necessary.   
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 However, there is a recent interpretation of compossibility that suggests that there may be 
an alternative way of understanding the connection between compossible substances.  James 
Messina and Donald Rutherford think that compossible substances do in fact have some kind of 
connection that is more robust than some contingent connection according to some set of 
contingent laws.  What they have in mind are connections of space and time.  They point to 
passages such as the following as suggesting that a general requirement of compossibility is 
relation or connectedness in a common order of space and time.   
I do not agree that "in order to know of the romance if 'Astrea' is possible, it is 
necessary to know its connections with the rest of the universe".  It would indeed 
be necessary to know this if it is to be compossible with the universe, and as a 
consequence to know if this romance has taken place, is taking place, or will take 
place in some corner of the world, for surely there would be no place for it without 
such connections.  And it is very true that what is not, never has been, and never 
will be is not possible, if we take the possible in the sense of the compossible, as 
I have just said.84 
Compossibles, Leibniz seems to be claiming, require some kind of connection; the romance of 
Astrea's compossibity with the actual world depends on whether or not the events of the novel is 
connected within the actual world's spatiotemporal manifold (“has taken place, is taking place, or 
will take place in some corner of the [actual] world”). 
 As a result, Messina and Rutherford argue that incompossible substances are those that 
don't share a single common order of space and time.  This is because Messina and Rutherford 
identify “the relation of [lawful] connection as foundational to Leibniz's conception of a possible 
world,” as suggested by §9 of the Theodicy:85 
For it must be known that all things are connected in each one of the possible 
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worlds: the universe, whatever it may be, is all of one piece, like an ocean: the 
least movement extends its effect there to any distance whatsoever, even though 
this effect becomes less perceptible in proportion to the distance.86 
Messina and Rutherford take the connection between the substances of a possible world to be one 
of “mutual dependence among the states of substances, such that a change in any one substance 
is reflected in a corresponding change in every other.”87  In other words, the members of a possible 
world condition one another's existence according to certain contingent laws decreed by God.  But 
in order for substances to condition one another's existence according to contingent laws, Messina 
and Rutherford think such substances must be ordered within a common spatiotemporal manifold, 
which they take as a necessary feature of a possible world.   
 They draw support for their claim from §8 of the Theodicy, where Leibniz writes: 
I call a world the entire series and entire collection of all existing things, lest it be 
said that several worlds could have existed at different times and different places.  
For they must be reckoned all together as one world or, if you will, as one universe.  
And even though one should fill all times and all places, it still remains true that 
one could have filled them in infinite ways, and that there is an infinity of possible 
worlds, from among which God must have chosen the best, since he does nothing 
without acting in accordance with supreme wisdom.88 
In this passage, Leibniz begins by describing the actual world as one that is connected within a 
common order of space and time, but, as Messina and Rutherford point out, he “goes on to affirm 
that there is an infinity of possible worlds, which are distinguished (in part) by the ways in which 
things are spatially and temporally ordered within them.”89  As a result, Messina and Rutherford 
argue that, for any set of things to be considered as a single possible world in which substances 
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are lawfully connected, each member of the set must be “spatiotemporally ordered with respect 
to every other member of the world, and nothing that is not a member of the world can have a 
spatiotemporal relation with respect to anything that is a member of the world.”90   
 On their reading, the notion of a world, as understood, is central to their explanation for 
why some possible substances cannot exist together in the same world.  Insofar as God creates a 
world, they argue, it must be one in which the members of such a world are ordered together 
within a common spatiotemporal manifold.  In other words, possible substances can only be 
connected in such a way to condition one another's existence in a lawful way only if they are 
related with respect to a common spatiotemporal order.  Possible substances that do not share a 
common spatiotemporal manifold will be incompossible.  Thus, “[i]f spatiotemporal relatedness 
is necessary for membership in a world, then not all possibles are members of one world,” and so 
not all possibles are compossible.91   
 Messina and Rutherford suggest that compossible substances must satisfy the condition 
of connectedness within a common spatiotemporal manifold.  Only once this condition is satisfied 
can substances be said to lawfully condition each other.  Messina and Rutherford argue for a 
connection between substances that is more robust than some contingent connection according to 
some law(s) but weaker than the conceptual connections suggested by the proponents of the 
“logical” interpretations.  In their view, the “lawful” interpretation offers too weak of a conception 
of compossibility.  Messina and Rutherford argue that taking some kind of lawful relation as 
determining compossibility fails to adequately rule out the possibility of God's creating all 
possible substances.  As Wilson pointed out, if some kind of lawful relation will necessarily obtain 
between any collection of substances, then there will be some law(s) that will describe the set of 
all possible substances.  That there is a possible world containing all possible substances, 
according to Messina and Rutherford, requires an explanation why God would not actualize such 
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a world, one which they think the proponents of the “lawful” interpretation fail to offer. 
 But they also argue that the connection between substances to be weaker than the one the 
proponents of the “logical” interpretation suggest.  They take the “world apart” passages as 
strongly suggestive that substances are not world-bound.  According to Messina and Rutherford, 
their interpretation offers a suitably restrictive notion of compossibility all the while servicing the 
“world apart” passages.  However, I will argue in the next chapter that not only is their criticism 
of the “lawful” interpretation problematic, but also that their interpretation seems inconsistent.  In 
my view, the “lawful” interpretations do provide an explanation for why God would not actualize 
all possibles even if such a world is possible.   
 
3.0 Laws, Independence, and God 
 In Leibniz's writings, we find the following characterizations of the notion of substance: 
“[E]ach substance is like a world apart, independent of all other things, except for God.”92  And, 
“[e]ach [substance] is, as it were, a certain separate world, and they agree among themselves 
through their phenomena, having no other intercourse or connection per se.”93  Some of Leibniz's 
commentators interpret such passages as suggesting that Leibnizian substances are ontologically 
independent existences that do not per se depend on one another.  They further think that such 
substances can exist independently from any finite substance, as a “world apart” (the “world apart” 
doctrine).  This inference seems to be supported by Leibniz himself, who, in his correspondence 
with Des Bosses, claims that God was able “absolutely [to create one of those substances that now 
exist without creating all the others], but was not able hypothetically, given that he decided to do 
everything most wisely and harmoniously.”94 
 It is important, however, to differentiate, on the one hand, the doctrine of ontological 
independence and, on the other, the “world apart” doctrine, and clarify the relationship between 
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the two doctrines because, although the two doctrines are closely related, they are distinct claims 
about substances.  The doctrine of ontological independence states that substances are “self-
sufficient” existences that do not have any “intercourse or connection per se” with any other finite 
substance such as to per se exclude or entail the existence of another.95  The “world apart” doctrine 
claims that it is metaphysically possible for any individual substance to exist independently of 
any finite substance.  The “world apart” doctrine implies the doctrine of independence.  After all, 
if an individual substance can exist independently of any finite substance, then it follows that that 
substance's nature is such that it does not per se entail the existence of another.  If a substance's 
existence per se entails the existence of other finite substance (their world-mates), then that 
substance can only exist with its world-mates,which will preclude the possibility of its existing as 
a “world apart”. 
 The doctrine of independence, however, does not imply that substances can exist as a 
“world apart”.  It is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for the “world apart” doctrine; one 
can hold that substances are ontologically independent without accepting that substances can be 
created independently.  For instance, if one were to hold that there is a maximality constraint on 
Leibnizian possible worlds such that, by definition, a possible world is a maximally consistent set 
of compossible complete concepts, then it will be metaphysically impossible for God to create an 
individual substance as a “world apart” even if it is the case that substances are ontologically 
independent. 
 While the doctrine of ontological independence alone does not imply the “world apart” 
doctrine, it would seem that it does imply that substances are per se compossible.  That is, God 
can create any combination of possible substances without logical inconsistency.  The doctrine of 
independence states that the formal natures of substances lack any reference to other finite 
substances such as to per se exclude one another's existence.  Accepting this fact, proponents of 
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the “lawful” interpretation hold that all possibles are per se compossible, although not in relation 
to certain law(s) that God decrees.  In their view, it is only in relation to law(s) that per se 
compossible substances become incompossible.  Therefore, if one accepts the doctrine of 
independence, the basis of compossibility cannot be the formal natures of substances considered 
in themselves. 
 Cover and O'Leary-Hawthorne accept that substances are ontologically independent and 
that all possible substances are per se compossible.  In addition, they hold the “world apart” 
doctrine, and think that it is metaphysically possible for God to create any substance 
independently of any finite substance.  Cover and O'Leary-Hawthorne reject the maximality 
constraint on possible worlds, and interpret maximality to mean something like “maximally 
compossible with the laws of greatest harmony.”96  Maximality, in other words, is a morally 
necessary feature of the best of all possible worlds, and not a metaphysical requirement of every 
possible world.   
 Per se compossibility, however, has one potentially devastating consequence from 
Leibniz's perspective, namely, a possible world can result from the set of all possible substances.  
If all possible substances are per se compossible, then it is possible for God to actualize all 
possibles.  But should God create all possible substances, no possibles will be left unactualized, 
which is tantamount to Spinozistic necessitarianism.  It is imperative for Cover and O'Leary-
Hawthorne (and any proponent of the “lawful” interpretation), then, to show why God would not 
actualize all possibles even though it is possible for God to do so.  The question is, then, what is 
stopping God from creating all per se compossible substances? 
 The rejection of the maximality constraint on possible worlds will be one response.  That 
is, even though all possible substances can constitute a possible world, it would not be the only 
possible world.  Such a world would be just one amongst the infinitely many possible worlds that 
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God could choose to create.  Even if it is supposed that God creates the set of all possible 
substances, since there would have been alternatives that could have been created, God's choice 
will not be absolutely necessary.  Also, since Cover and O'Leary-Hawthorne take compossibility 
to be determined by whether or not possible substances instantiate the requisite hypothetically 
necessary laws of harmony, they can maintain that God would not create all possible substances 
because such a collection would, presumably, fail to instantiate the best laws.  In other words, 
while it is possible for God to create all possible substances, it would be morally impossible for 
God to decree morally inferior laws of harmony. 
 James Messina and Donald Rutherford, however, think such explanations fail to resolve 
the problem at hand.  They write, 
The compossibility relation is introduced by Leibniz to explain why God does 
not actualize all possible substances.  Rescher and Mates have a ready explanation: 
there is no such possible world, because certain possibles exclude one another.  
Cover and O'Leary-Hawthorne's account of compossibility, by contrast, does not 
so much explain God's choice as presuppose it.  Furthermore, it is not obvious 
that God would not choose to actualize a world consisting of all possible 
substances if such a world were indeed possible.  Cover and O'Leary-Hawthorne 
assume that God's preference for harmony would trump his interest in diversity 
and plenitude when faced with a world containing all possible substances.  Yet 
there is evidence that Leibniz's God is disposed to actualize as many possibles as 
he can, consistent with those possibles forming a single world.97 
Messina and Rutherford seem to think invoking harmony or law to explain the incompossiblity 
of substances is not restrictive enough to block God's disposition to create as much as possible.98  
They base their views on such textual evidence as the following: 
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[A]ll possibles, that is, everything that expresses essence or possible reality, strive 
with equal right for existence in proportion to the amount of essence or reality or 
the degree of perfection they contain, for perfection is nothing but the amount of 
essence.   
From this it is obvious that of the infinite combinations of possibilities 
and possible series, the one that exists is the one through which the most essence 
or possibility is brought into existence.”99 
Given Leibniz's claim that God will create the possible series that contains with “the most essence 
or possibility”, Messina and Rutherford argue that there needs to be “logical or metaphysical 
obstacles to God creating a world from all possible substances,” for otherwise,“it is natural to 
assume that God would create such a world.”100  If it is accepted that individual substances' formal 
natures, considered by themselves, do not logically exclude one another as to preclude God's 
creation of all possibles, then it seems that, if God has the disposition to create as much as possible, 
per se compossibility will entail the actuality of all possibles.   
 This conclusion seems unacceptable insofar as we take the actuality of all possibles as 
non-negotiable from Leibniz's perspective.  It appears, then, that substances cannot be per se 
compossible.  But while Messina and Rutherford think that all substances cannot be per se 
compossible, they argue on their reading that God can create an individual substance as a “world 
apart”.  Given their criticism of Cover and O'Leary-Hawthorne, this seems to be an odd claim.  
After all, it seems that Leibniz's “world apart” doctrine implies that substances are ontologically 
independent such that no individual substance's nature will per se exclude or entail the existence 
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of any other finite substance.  And if no individual substance will per se exclude another's 
existence, then it would seem that substances will be per se compossible, given that the only 
incompossible substances are those that cannot be actualized together.  So, how can Messina and 
Rutherford affirm the “world apart” doctrine all the while criticizing the “lawful” interpretations' 
holding per se compossibility? 
 Given Messina and Rutherford's objection and their reading of compossibility, it seems 
that they are committed to the following claims: 
(1) God has the disposition to create as much as possible. 
(2) It is metaphysically possible that God creates any individual substance 
as a “world apart” (“world apart” doctrine). 
(3) Not all possibles are actual. 
I will argue, however, that Messina and Rutherford cannot hold these three claims consistently. If 
substances can exist as a “world apart”, and if God is disposed to create as much as possible, then 
it seems to follow that (3) must be false on their interpretation.  Since the notion of compossibility 
is designed to secure (3), it follows that the conjunction of (1) and (2) must be false.   
 As Messina and Rutherford see it, the “lawful” interpretation fail to offer a “suitably 
restrictive notion of compossibility.”101  That is, “if the compossibility relation is to serve as the 
basis of a satisfying response to Spinoza, it cannot be 'up to God' which possible substances are 
compossible with one another.”  Their criticism, therefore, is that the “proponents of the lawful 
reading simply assume that God would not choose to actualize a world consisting of all possible 
substances, rather than explain why he could not do so.”102  However, it seems to me that Messina 
and Rutherford are neglecting a central feature of Leibniz's understanding of the relation between 
God and the laws he decrees.  For Leibniz, the laws that God chooses are morally necessary and 
chosen on the basis of final causes.  The laws are intrinsically pleasing to God, which is why God 
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chose the actual laws rather than another possible set of laws.  If we take this view of God's choice, 
then the “lawful” interpretations do, in fact, explain why God would not create all possible 
substances, or so I will argue. 
 The plan of this chapter will be as follows.  In [3.1], the focus will be Messina and 
Rutherford's arguments on how their interpretation can accommodate the “world apart” passages.  
In [3.2], I will challenge Messina and Rutherford and argue that it is metaphysically possible on 
their interpretation that God actualizes all possible substances.  Then, in [3.3], I will argue that 
Messina and Rutherford's interpretation will also imply the actuality of all possibles if it is the 
case that God has the disposition to create as much as possible.  I will conclude in [3.4] by arguing 
that Messina and Rutherford's objection fails to undermine the solution offered by the proponents 
of the “lawful” interpretation.   
3.1 The “World Apart” Doctrine 
 Messina and Rutherford argue for an interpretation of compossibility that places an 
emphasis on the notion of a world, understood as “an abstract relational structure according to 
which God conceives of possibilities of existence,” which they claim is conceptually prior to that 
of compossibility: any two substances are compossible if and only if they can be conceived by 
God to exist together in the same world, which will be determined by substances' essential 
relations of space and time.103  And although they accept that every individual substance is a 
member of exactly one possible world, that is, world bound, they deny that God is, therefore, 
logically necessitated to create a substance's world-mates insofar as he creates that substance.  
God could create an individual substance as a “world apart”. 
 Their strategy for securing (2) depends on their distinction between “what God can do 
absolutely and what God can do in meeting the objective of actualizing a world.”104  They infer 
this distinction from the two ways they think God can conceive of any possible substance.   
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In conceiving of a substance as possible, God conceives of both the internal states 
by which it would be modified were it to exist and the ways in which its states 
would be related, were that world to exist.  God's conception of the internal states 
of any substance presupposes nothing about the internal states of its worldmates; 
he conceives of the substance as a 'world apart'.  By contrast, God's conception 
of a substance's extrinsic denominations necessarily involves an idea of how it 
would be related to the other members of its world, in particular, the ways in 
which their states would be 'connected'.  Substances are connected in a world in 
accordance with contingent, causal laws that God freely decrees in choosing to 
actualize that world.  Thus, in conceiving of the extrinsic denominations of a 
substance, God conceives of possible free decrees he would exercise in bringing 
its world into existence.”105 
Messina and Rutherford believe that (2) can be secured because God can create a substance 
independently by simply refraining from exercising the free decrees that will create that 
substance's world.  To create a substance apart from its world-mates, “God has only to decide not 
to enact the free decrees associated with the creation of that world and instead to enact different 
free decrees associated with the existence of a solitary substance.”   
 Messina and Rutherford think that “the content of a substance's complete concept is 
identified with God's prevolitional knowledge of the substance, i.e., the knowledge God has of its 
properties independently of his knowledge of his own actual free decrees.” 106   Since God's 
knowledge of individual substances is divorced from the knowledge of his free decrees, “God 
knows a possible substance as an individual in knowing the intrinsic properties (e.g., perceptual 
states) it would have were it to exist and the relational properties it would have were the other 
members of its world to exist.”107  The difference in God's knowledge of a substance, they argue, 
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“is explained by his knowledge of the different free decrees that would be exercised in them, not 
by the content of the relevant complete concept(s).” 108 Therefore, “if God chooses to create a 
world, specified in terms of the free decrees that define its contingent causal structure, he is 
committed to creating all and only those substances that comprise that world.”  However, God 
can create an individual substance independently of its world-mates by refraining from exercising 
the free decrees contained in its complete concept needed to create its world.  In other words, by 
actualizing the substance as conceived by only its intrinsic properties. “There is no reason to think 
God would do this,” Messina and Rutherford point out, but nevertheless, “it remains something 
that God could do.”109 
 I think, however, Messina and Rutherford's criticism of Cover and O'Leary-Hawthorne's 
interpretation is just as applicable to their own.  This is because, I think that their acceptance of 
the “world apart” doctrine, in conjunction with (1), the claim that God has the disposition to create 
as much as possible, will entail the actuality of all possible substances.  It seems to me that their 
reading implies that all possible substances will be per se compossible, and that all possibles can 
be actualized together if God chooses to create every possible substance by solely its intrinsic 
denominations.  But if it is possible for God to create all possible substances in this way, and if 
we suppose that (1) is true, then it appears that God will create all possible substances, which will 
leave no possibles unactualized.  My task then will be to substantiate the following two claims.  
First, it is metaphysically possible for God to create all possible substances on Messina and 
Rutherford's interpretation.  Second, God will create all possible substances given (1). 
3.2 The Possibility of Spinozism 
 Recall that Messina and Rutherford accept that God can conceive of, and therefore create, 
an individual substance as a “world apart” because “God's conception of the internal states of any 
substance presupposes nothing about the internal states of its worldmates.”110  On the assumption 
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that God can conceive of any individual substance by solely their internal states, that is, limit his 
knowledge of any individual substance to its essential intrinsic denominations, then it seems it is 
possible for God to conceive of any two possible substances' existing together.  Suppose, then, 
that God conceives all possible substances in this way.  Then it seems that God could create all 
possibles because substances conceived in this way will not per se exclude one another.  All that 
God would have to do to create all possible substances will be to enact the free decrees that will 
actualize every possible substance with only their intrinsic denominations.   
 The mere conceivability of the actuality of all possible substances, I think, already is 
sufficient to entail that it is metaphysically possible for God to create all possible substances on 
Messina and Rutherford's interpretation.  This is because, as Messina and Rutherford themselves 
point out, what is conceivable and what is metaphysically possible for Leibniz are coextensive: 
“[F]or Leibniz the set of things that God cannot conceive is coextensive with the set of things that 
God cannot do.”111  After all, they think any individual substance can be created as a “world apart” 
because God can conceive of any individual substance by its intrinsic denominations alone, 
independently of its extrinsic denominations.  By the same token, it seems that God can conceive 
all possible substances as actual by limiting his knowledge of every possible substance to its 
intrinsic denominations, which entails that God can create all possible substances in this way. 
 But there is a further reason why I think it is metaphysically possible for God to actualize 
all possibles on Messina and Rutherford's interpretation.  It seems that Messina and Rutherford 
take every individual substance to have its relational properties essentially.  This is because they 
think that “any substance is partly defined through the relations it bears to the other substances in 
its world.”112   This seems to mean that a substance's relational properties are amongst that 
substance's essential properties.   
 But the claim that substances have their relations essentially seems to be inconsistent with 
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their strategy for securing (2).  Messina and Rutherford think that substances can exist without 
their relational properties because “nothing in Leibniz's complete concept theory precludes God 
from actualizing a substance apart from its world-mates and hence without the relational 
properties specified by its complete concept.”113  They (if I am reading them correctly) seem to 
have the following intuition.  Since all the properties contained in Adam's complete concept, 
including his relational properties, are essential to him, this entails that Adam exists in only one 
possible world (i.e., the actual world).  Adam will be world-bound.  However, Adam's relational 
properties' existence necessarily depends on the existence of his spatiotemporally defined possible 
world.  So, insofar as God chooses to create Adam without also creating his world, they think 
Adam can exist without his relational properties.  In other words, they seem to deny that it is the 
case that any substance, should it exist, necessarily exists with its essential relational properties.  
A substance can exist without its essential relations insofar as God refrains from creating the 
world on which their existence depends. 
 This view, however, seems to be problematic as it seems to call into question whether 
substances' relational properties are even essential.  They think it is possible for God to create a 
substance as a “world apart” by not creating that substance's world, namely, by refraining from 
actualizing its essential relations.  But if we take an essential property of a substance to be that 
which that substance, should it exist, necessarily has such that it cannot lack it, then, on Messina 
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and Rutherford's interpretation, relational properties are not essential to substances.  They are, 
rather, accidental to God's choice to create a possible world: God can create the identical 
substance with its relational properties by choosing to create that substance's possible world, or 
without them by choosing to not create its world.  For it to be possible for Adam to be created as 
a “world apart”, Adam's essential properties cannot include reference to Eve, Cain, and the rest 
of his world-mates such that God necessarily conceives of Adam's world-mates when conceiving 
of Adam.114  In other words, Adam, should he exist, cannot necessarily exist with his relational 
properties, since this will entail the existence of the substances to which he stands in relation.  If 
Adam's relational properties are essential, then it seems that Adam, should he exist, will 
necessarily exist with his relations.  Therefore, if Messina and Rutherford accept that substances 
can be created as a “world apart”, it must be the case that relational properties are not essential to 
substances. 
 But if it is the case that any substance's relational properties are not essential, it seems 
that substances are per se compossible in the sense that God can create any combination of 
possible substances, on the condition that God refrains from actualizing any substances' possible 
world.  Messina and Rutherford think that God can prevolitionally conceive, and therefore create, 
any individual substance by its intrinsic denominations alone.  But it doesn't appear that any two 
substances' intrinsic properties will be inconsistent.  If we understand incompossible substances 
as those that cannot be actualized together, then it seems that any two possible substances, 
conceived by solely their essential intrinsic denominations, can be actualized together insofar as 
God chooses not to actualize any substance's world. 
 Messina and Rutherford may, however, have one possible response available to them.  
Even if it is granted that God can create any individual substance by its essential intrinsic 
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denominations alone, it may still be impossible for God to create all possibles because there is no 
possible world in which all possible substances are members.  Consider the following comment 
from Messina and Rutherford: 
[I]t might be wondered why there could not be a possible world w2 whose 
members were qualitatively identical (by virtue of possessing the same intrinsic 
denominations) to a proper subset of the members of a maximal world w1.  This 
scenario is blocked by Leibniz's 'no purely extrinsic denominations' thesis. … 
According to the no purely extrinsic denominations thesis, any change in a 
relational property of a substance entails some change in an intrinsic property of 
it, by virtue of the way that substances condition each others' existence in a world.  
In the case of the imagined scenario, the members of w2 would not be conditioned 
by (all) the same substances as their counterparts in the maximal world w1.  Hence, 
their intrinsic denominations (e.g., their perceptual states) would have to be 
different from those of their counterparts in w1.115 
Based on their views here, one possible response, then, could be that God could not create all 
possible substances with purely their intrinsic denominations because any individual substance's 
intrinsic denominations can only ground relational properties to its world-mates and no other.  In 
other words, God will be able to create an individual substance, Adam, as a “world apart”, but 
insofar as God creates Adam with his intrinsic properties, God can only further create all the 
substances with intrinsic denominations that can ground relations with Adam.  Should Adam be 
conditioned differently than the way his intrinsic denominations specify, by Messina and 
Rutherford's lights,that Adam will be a different individual with different intrinsic denominations.  
Therefore, it seems that God cannot create any combination of intrinsic denominations, given the 
'no purely extrinsic denominations' thesis.   
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 It seems that Messina and Rutherford understand the 'no purely extrinsic denominations' 
thesis to mean that a substance's intrinsic denominations fully ground its extrinsic denominations.  
Therefore, for any individual substance to exist with its intrinsic denominations, it cannot be a 
member of any other possible world than the one its intrinsic denominations specify.  If all 
possible substances are members of a possible world in which they exist with only their intrinsic 
denominations, since every substance will condition each other's existence, every possible 
substance will have different extrinsic denominations to the ones they would have in their 
respective possible worlds.  Since it is impossible for any individual substance to have different 
extrinsic properties than the ones their intrinsic denominations specify, it follows that there is no 
such possible world. 
 This response seems to rule out my suggestion that it is possible on Messina and 
Rutherford's interpretation that God creates all possible substances with only their intrinsic 
properties.  It seems that the 'no purely extrinsic denominations' thesis places a restriction on 
which substances God can create together.  While God can create any individual substance by 
only its intrinsic denominations, it doesn't follow that God will also be able to create all possible 
substances by their intrinsic denominations, since intrinsic denominations fully specify world-
mates. 
 This explanation, however, will be inconsistent with Messina and Rutherford's claim that 
“God's conception of the internal states of any substance presupposes nothing about the internal 
states of its worldmates.”116  This claim is central to their strategy of securing (2), since insofar 
God can conceive of a substance without also necessarily conceiving its world-mates, God will 
be able to create a substance as a “world apart”.  But given their understanding of the 'no purely 
extrinsic denominations' thesis, how can God conceive of a substance without also conceiving of 
its world-mates?  It seems that they hold that a substance's intrinsic denominations fully ground117 
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its extrinsic denominations.  But if we were to assume a closure principle (i.e., If subject S knows 
P, and P entails R, then S knows R), then it would appear that God, an omniscient being, will 
necessarily know a substance's extrinsic denominations by knowing its intrinsic denominations.118  
In conceiving of Adam, in other words, God will also necessarily conceive of all his world-mates, 
which will preclude the possibility of God's creating Adam as a “world apart”.  It doesn't appear, 
then, that they can hold, on the one hand, that God can conceive of a substance without also 
conceiving its extrinsic properties, and, on the other, their understanding of the 'no purely extrinsic 
denominations' thesis.   
 In addition, I don't think that their understanding of the 'no purely extrinsic denominations' 
thesis will rule out the possibility that God creates all possible intrinsic histories.  Rutherford 
explains the thesis in the following way: 
Leibniz typically explains the fact that there are no purely extrinsic 
denominations in terms of the “real connection” or “universal sympathy” of all 
things.  As a consequence of this connection or sympathy, he argues, nothing can 
come to be true of anything anywhere in the universe without necessitating a 
change in their internal states of all other things, and hence a change in their 
intrinsic denominations.119 
The 'no purely extrinsic denominations' thesis will only seem to preclude a possible world of all 
possible intrinsic histories if there is a “real connection” between all the members.  Without this 
assumption, however, it doesn't appear that it is impossible for God to create all possible intrinsic 
histories.  And, it seems, Leibniz was very much open to the possibility that God creates 
substances without such connection: “God could give to each substance its own phenomena 
                                                 
a substance's extrinsic denominations by simply knowing its intrinsic denominations.  God would also 
have to know the laws of expression that obtain between substances in order to know their extrinsic 
denominations.  See note 39. 
118The epistemic closure principle can be formulated in various ways, and is a topic of controversy in the 
field of epistemology.  Here, I assume that, for an omniscient being, that it will necessarily hold.   
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independent of those of others, but in this way he would have made as many worlds without 
connection.” 120   If God were to create the set of all intrinsic histories without any “real 
connection”, then it seems that it would be possible for God to actualize all possible intrinsic 
histories.   
 Messina and Rutherford argue that God can create any individual substance as a “world 
apart”, or as part of a possible world.  The difference, they think, “in God's knowledge of the two 
cases is explained by his knowledge of the different free decrees that would be exercised in them, 
not by the content of the relevant complete concept(s).”121  They seem to think it is possible for 
any substance to exist without its relational properties, since God can exercise the free decrees 
that will result in the creation of that substance without its world.  But suppose that God exercises 
the free decrees that result in the creation of an individual substance with only its intrinsic 
denominations, and further suppose that God does this for every possible substance.  No logical 
inconsistency will follow from the supposition that all possible substances are actualized with 
only its essential intrinsic properties, which will not per se exclude the existence of another.   
 Therefore, insofar as Messina and Rutherford hold that it is possible for God to create any 
individual substance as a “world apart”, it seems that it will also be possible for God to actualize 
all possible substances on Messina and Rutherford's interpretation.  In order to achieve this, of 
course, God will have to create every individual substance by only its essential intrinsic properties.  
But even if it is possible for God to create all possible substances, this fact alone doesn't seem to 
entail that all possibles are actual.  The question is, then, are there reasons for God to abandon his 
objective of creating a single unique world, in favor of creating all possible substances with only 
their intrinsic denominations? 
3.3 The Threat of Spinozism 
 In the previous section, I have argued that Messina and Rutherford's strategy for securing 
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(2), the “world apart” doctrine, seems to leave open the metaphysical possibility that God 
actualizes all possible substances by only their intrinsic denominations.  Whether or not an 
individual substance exists in its spatiotemporally defined possible world or as a “world apart”, 
they argue, is ultimately up to God's choice.  But why would God choose not to create all possibles 
by only their intrinsic histories? 
 Messina and Rutherford seem to hint that it is morally necessary that God creates a 
spatiotemporally ordered possible world. 
God could decide not to create a world, choosing instead to create one or more 
separate substances, which lacked the unity of a world.  In this case God would 
actualize the individual substance without actualizing the free decrees contained 
in its complete concept.  Thus, God would create the substance, without creating 
it as a part of a world.  As Leibniz emphasizes, there is no reason to think God 
would do this.  Nevertheless, it remains something that God could do.122 
The natural answer to my query above is, then, that, while it is metaphysically possible for God 
to not create a spatiotemporally ordered world, it is morally impossible for God to create it.  But 
this seems to be problematic given their commitment to (1).  After all, Messina and Rutherford 
criticize Cover and O'Leary-Hawthorne (and all “lawful” interpretations) on the point that if all 
possible substances can be actualized, and God is disposed to create as much as possible, then it 
seems natural to assume that God would.  Given Messina and Rutherford's commitment to (1), it 
seems that the bald fact that it is metaphysically possible for God to actualize all possible 
substances on their interpretation implies that a morally perfect God will actualize all possibles. 
 However, Messina and Rutherford may point out that the envisioned scenario where all 
possible substances are actual fails to satisfy their interpretation of a possible world for Leibniz.  
Recall that on their view a possible world for Leibniz necessarily has a spatiotemporal manifold.  
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They may point out that their criticism of Cover and O'Leary-Hawthorne is that Leibniz's God 
would “actualize as many possibles as he can, consistent with those possibles forming a single 
world.”123  Since Cover and O'Leary-Hawthorne's interpretation allows the set of all possible 
substances to constitute a possible world, and assuming that Leibniz's God desires to create a 
possible world, it follows that Cover and O'Leary-Hawthorne leave open the possibility that God 
will create such a world.  If God is disposed to create as much as possible, and if the set of all 
possible substances is a possible world, then God will choose to create it.  However, assuming 
that the set of all possible intrinsic histories will fail to instantiate a spatiotemporal manifold, 
which is necessary on Messina and Rutherford's conception of a possible world, and further that 
Leibniz's God desires to create substances that are ordered in space and time, it follows that God 
will not create the set of all possible intrinsic denominations. 
 Such an explanation, unfortunately, does not seem to address the problem at hand.  As 
Messina and Rutherford point out, “the compossibility relation is introduced by Leibniz to explain 
why God does not actualize all possible substances.”124  They seem to assume that God can only 
create two or more substances only if they are sufficiently connected by a common order of space 
and time.  However, this seems to be contradicted by Leibniz's claim that “God could give to each 
substance its own phenomena independent of others, but in this way he would have made as many 
worlds without connection.”125  Leibniz seems very much open to the possibility that God creates 
substances without any kind of connection with one another.  Just as Messina and Rutherford 
criticize Cover and O'Leary-Hawthorne for seemingly assuming “that God's preference for 
harmony would trump his interest in diversity and plentitude when faced with a world containing 
all possible substances,” I think the same criticism can apply to Messina and Rutherford's 
interpretation as well: that is, why assume that God's preference for a world with a well-defined 
spatiotemporal ordering will trump his interest in diversity and plentitude when faced with the 
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possibility of actualizing all possibles.126 
 But in addition, it doesn't seem obvious to me that the set of all possible intrinsic histories 
will fail to instantiate some kind of order of space and time.  Messina and Rutherford claim that 
“it is integral to God's knowledge of a set of substances as a possible world that they are conceived 
as conditioning each other's existence in a lawful manner.”127  They think that “substances can be 
conceived as belonging to the same world, within which they are lawfully connected, only if they 
are related according to the order of space and time.”128  A necessary condition for a collection of 
possible substances to be sufficiently connected such as to be considered a possible world is, they 
argue, a common order of space and time.  But is it the case that the set of all possible intrinsic 
histories cannot relate in this way? 
 I don't think so.  While it can be granted that on Messina and Rutherford's interpretation 
that no possible substance can exist in any other spatiotemporally ordered world than the one its 
relations specify, I see no reason to think that God's creating all possible intrinsic histories will 
imply that that set of substances cannot instantiate a common order of space and time.  After all, 
given Leibniz's denial of the metaphysical possibility of unlawfulness or irregularity, it would 
seem that some kind of lawful conditioning will obtain between all possible substances' intrinsic 
denominations (i.e., the perceptual states).  Thus, if God can conceive the set of all possible 
intrinsic histories, then some kind of lawful conditioning will necessarily obtain.  If the set of all 
possible intrinsic histories can be conceived to lawfully condition one another, then, by Messina 
and Rutherford's formulation, it seems that such a set will be possible world with a spatiotemporal 
manifold.   
3.4 Laws and Final Causes 
 Messina and Rutherford criticize the “lawful” interpretations in that they fail to explain 
why God would not actualize all possibles given the fact that such a world is possible.  But this 
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criticism, I think, neglects a central characteristic of Leibniz's God, namely, that he acts on the 
basis of final causes (or the perception of value).  Laws of the actual world, I will argue, were 
chosen precisely because Leibniz thinks these laws are the best, which sufficiently explains why, 
even though all possibles could be actualized, God did not.  If we consider the nature of the laws 
of the actual world, it should be clear, insofar as God decided upon them, that not all possibles 
are actual.   
 Leibniz thinks that the laws that are true in the actual world are morally necessary.  At 
Theodicy §349, Leibniz says, 
[T]he laws of Nature regulating movements are neither entirely necessary nor 
entirely arbitrary.  The middle course to be taken is that they are a choice of the 
most perfect wisdom.  And this great example of the laws of motion shows with 
the utmost clarity how much difference there is between these three cases, to wit, 
firstly an absolute necessity, metaphysical or geometrical, which may be called 
blind, and which does not depend upon any but efficient causes; in the second 
place, a moral necessity, which comes from the free choice of wisdom in relation 
to final causes; and finally in the third place, something absolutely arbitrary, 
depending upon an indifference of equipoise, which is imagined, but which cannot 
exist, where there is no sufficient reason either in the efficient or in the final 
cause.129 
The laws of nature cannot be absolutely necessary because the laws of motion are not 
geometrically demonstrable: The laws “do not spring entirely from the principle of necessity, but 
rather from the principle of perfection and order; they are an effect of the choice and the wisdom 
of God.”130  In support of this claim, he points to his two principles of the equality of cause and 
effect and continuity, which, because they cannot be geometrically demonstrated, he claims must 
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be the product of a wise creator. 
 Also, the laws of nature cannot be said to be arbitrary because of the violation of the 
Principle of Sufficient Reason.  The laws of nature would only be arbitrary if there were no 
sufficient reason for its choice from other laws.  However, Leibniz denies that there is no sufficient 
reason for the laws in the actual world.  Since God chose the laws of nature according to final 
causes, there is a sufficient reason for why God freely chose to create these laws rather than 
another because they are the best. 
 The laws in the actual world, then, are the best laws, which is the sufficient reason for 
God's choice of these laws rather than another.  They were selected on the basis of final causes, 
and, it seems, somewhat independent of its intended function: “For the wisest mind so acts, as far 
as it is possible, that the means are also in a sense ends, that is, they are desirable not only on 
account of what they do, but on account of what they are.”131  Whatever functions that the best 
laws will have, this alone was not the determinate factor for God's choosing them, since the laws 
that were chosen precisely because they are intrinsically pleasing to God. 
 But how does this then relate to substantial compossibility?  Well, by Leibniz's lights, the 
fact that God chose the laws of the actual world based on final causes is the reason why not all 
possibles are actual. 
For my part, I believe that the laws of mechanics which serve as foundation for 
the whole system depend on final causes, that is to say, on the will of God 
determined to do what is most perfect, and that matter takes on not all possible 
forms but only the most perfect ones.132 
In this passage, Leibniz attempts to differentiate himself from Descartes, who holds two claims, 
according to Leibniz, which imply Spinoza's conclusion that all possibles are actual.  The first is 
the denial of final causation in physics, and the second is that “matter takes on, successively, all 
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possible forms.”133  As he describes it: “These are precisely the opinions which Spinoza has 
expounded more clearly, namely, that justice, beauty, and order are things merely relative to us 
but that the perfection of God consists in that magnitude of his activity by virtue of which nothing 
is possible or conceivable which he does not actually produce.” 
 Therefore, Leibniz seems to think that, because God chose to create the laws that are most 
intrinsically pleasing to him, God only created those possibles that conform to them.  If we 
consider some of the laws in the actual world, I think we can see why, on the hypothesis that God 
chose these laws, that not all possibles are actual.  One of the laws intrinsically pleasing to reason 
is principle of the equality of cause and effect, which is contingent and morally necessary.  Leibniz 
thought there were other principles true in the actual world (i.e., the principle of continuity), but 
all the contingent laws of nature that obtain in the actual world are derived from these principles.    
I have found that one may account for these laws [of motion] by assuming that 
the effect is always equal in force to its cause, or, which amounts to the same 
thing, that the same force is conserved always: but this axiom of higher 
philosophy cannot be demonstrated geometrically.134 
For Leibniz, any supposed law of nature that violate these principles (i.e., the Cartesian laws of 
motion) will be false in the actual world, but still possible in themselves.135  I think it is reasonable 
to suppose that not all possibles will be able to conform to this law.  After all, it will exclude those 
that conform to the Cartesian laws of motion, which will be grounded by different principles (e.g., 
the principle of the ½  cause and effect, or that of ½  cause and ½  effect, whatever they may be) 
than the one in the actual world.  Thus, insofar as the principle of the equality of cause and effect 
was chosen, it seems that only the substances that can conform to this principle or law can be 
actualized.   
 Messina and Rutherford, therefore, seem to misunderstand the “lawful” strategy to 
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compossibility.  As they understand it, 
For proponents of the lawful reading … facts about which substances are 
compossible (and thus which substances can belong to the same possible world) 
are 'up to God'.  On their view, God freely decrees certain laws for a world, and 
the compossibility or incompossibility of any set of substances is a function of 
whether or not they instantiate the relevant laws.136 
In a sense they are correct.  God is free to decree certain laws for a world, but they seem to ignore 
the fact that Leibniz's God will choose the laws based on final causes.  The laws partition 
substances into different possible worlds and there may be a law(s) that describes all possible 
substances.  However, the “lawful” interpretations maintain that God is morally necessitated to 
choose the best laws, and therefore compossibility of substances will be a function of whether 
possible substances will instantiate the best laws.  It seems to me that the “lawful” interpretations 
can maintain that the reason not all possible substances are not actual is because there was no 
sufficient reason for God to choose the law(s) to which all possibles will conform.  Such laws 
were morally inferior to the laws that God chose.   
 Thus, I think the “lawful” interpretations do, in fact, offer a sufficiently restrictive notion 
of compossibility, contrary to Messina and Rutherford's claims.  Given that God chooses laws on 
the basis of final causes, the proponents of the “lawful” interpretation can simply say that the best 
laws are morally necessary and not all possibles can instantiate them.  Messina and Rutherford 
can push back and say that, nevertheless, Leibniz's God has the disposition to create as much as 
possible, so insofar as laws partition possibles into different possible worlds, and among them, a 
possible world consisting of all possible substances is possible, then God would choose such a 
world, regardless of the laws that describe it.   
 But this is not so much a criticism against the “lawful” interpretation as it is against 
                                                 
136MR, 967 
  Kim 55 
Leibniz's philosophy itself.  If the compossibility relation is one that partitions possibles into 
different possible worlds, and one of its intended functions is to show why not all possibles are 
actual, saying that God's choice of laws based on final causes results in the existence of some but 
not all possibles will be an adequate explanation.  To say, then, that God's choice of laws is not 
sufficient to decide God's choice of the best of all possible worlds is broaching a different 
(although related) subject, namely, one what basis does God choose the best possible world.  But 
in the passages I cited above, it is clear that Leibniz thinks that God chooses the laws based on 
final causes and for this reason not all possibles are actual.  Whether ultimately this explanation 
is consistent with Leibniz's other philosophical commitments will be an independent issue. 
 
4.0 Conclusion 
 In this thesis, we saw the various ways that commentators have proposed understanding 
Leibniz's notion of compossibility.  On the one hand, there is the “logical” interpretation that takes 
the basis of compossibility to be logical consistency between complete concepts of substances.  
Should the supposed conjunction of any two complete concepts imply a logical inconsistency, 
then the corresponding substances will be incompossible.  However, I pointed out that one major 
problem with this interpretation is the entailment of world-bound substances, which is in tension 
with Leibniz's claims in the “world apart” passages.   
 The “lawful” interpretation, on the other hand, takes law(s), which God freely decrees in 
creating a world, as the basis of compossibility.  All possible substances are per se compossible 
and it is only on the basis of laws that possible substances are incompossible.  In my view, there 
are good reasons for thinking that the “lawful” interpretation offers a more accurate view of the 
notion of compossibility.  One reason is that the “lawful” interpretation's understanding of the 
notion of substance seems to better align with Leibniz's claims about substances.  Another is the 
apparent importance of harmony in Leibniz's system, which Leibniz sometimes says precludes 
the existence of possible things.   
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 The “lawful” interpretation, however, has been criticized recently by Messina and 
Rutherford on the point that taking law(s) as determining compossibility is too weak to preclude 
the actuality of all possible substances.  In their view, given the evidence that Leibniz's God is 
disposed to create as much as possible, certain lawful restrictions will not be adequate to block 
Leibniz's system from collapsing into Spinozistic necessitarianism.  If all possible substances are 
per se compossible, they argue, and God has the disposition to create as much as possible, it would 
seem that God would choose to actualize all possible substances. 
 I have argued that this criticism is problematic for two reasons.  First, it equally applies 
to Messina and Rutherford's interpretation because they accept that any individual substance can 
exist as a “world apart”.  By allowing individual substances to exist independently of its world-
mates, I have argued that it is possible on Messina and Rutherford's reading that God can create 
all possible substances.  Since it is possible, given their commitment to the claim that God has the 
disposition to create as much as possible, I have argued that God would. 
 Second, the objection conflicts with Leibniz's claim that God acts based on final causes.  
To the question, “Why would God not create all possible substances even though all substances 
are per se compossible?”, the proponents of the “lawful” interpretation can simply answer that 
the law(s) that describe such a world is inferior and less valuable than the ones that describe a less 
populated possible world.  Despite Messina and Rutherford's claim that the proponents of the 
“lawful” interpretation fail to offer an explanation for why God would not create all possibles, I 
think the proponents of the “lawful” interpretation do in fact provide one.  God chooses the best 
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국문초록 
이 논문의 목적은 라이프니츠의 공존가능성 개념에 대한 여러 해석들을 비판적으로 
검토하는 것이다. 공존가능성에 대한 라이프니츠의 입장에 대한 해석은 크게 두 가지로, 
“논리적” 해석과 “법칙적” 해석으로 나뉜다. “논리적” 해석에 따르면, 가능실체들의 본성들 
또는 본질들(완전 개체 개념들)이 논리적으로 일관적일 경우 그리고 오직 그런 경우에만 그 
가능실체들은 동일한 가능세계에 존재할 수 있다. 반면에 “법칙적” 해석을 지지하는 
철학자들은 실체들의 완전 개체 개념이 그 자체만으로 공존가능성의 기초를 제공한다는 
논리적 해석을 거부한다. 그들의 관점에 따르면, 실체들의 공존가능성을 결정하기 
위해서는 실체들의 완전 개체 개념뿐만 아니라 실체들이 어떤 법칙을 공유하는지도 
고려해야 한다. 그런데 James Messina와 Donald Rutherford는 “논리적” 해석도 “법칙적” 
해석도 라이프니츠의 입장에 대한 적절한 해석이 아니라고 주장하며, 공존가능성에 대한 
새로운 해석을 제시한다. 그러나 나는 그들이 “법칙적” 해석에 제기한 비판이 그들 자신의 
입장에도 적용된다는 것을 보임으로써, 그들의 주장을 비판할 것이다.  
 
 
 
 
 
